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Maximizing long-run gains often requires taking on some degree of risk, yet decision-
makers often exhibit risk aversion (RA), rejecting risky prospects even when these have
higher expected value (EV) than safer alternatives. We investigated whether explicit strat-
egy instruction and practice can decrease prepotent RA, and whether aging impacts the
efﬁcacy of such an intervention. Participants performed a paired lottery task with options
varying in risk and magnitude, both before and after practice with a similar task that
encouraged maximization of EV and instruction to use this strategy in risky decisions.
In both younger and older adults (OAs), strategy training reduced RA. Although RA was
age-equivalent at baseline, larger training effects were observed in younger adults (YAs).
These effects were not explained by risk-related (i.e., affective) interference effects or com-
putation ability, but were consistent with a progressive, age-related neglect of the strategy
across trials. Our ﬁndings suggest that strategy training can diminish RA, but that training
efﬁcacy is reduced among OAs, potentially due to goal neglect. We discuss implications
for neural mechanisms that may distinguish older andYAs’ risky decision-making.
Keywords: risk aversion, goal neglect, strategy training, aging, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
Risktakingplaysanessentialroleinthetransactions,investments,
and decisions that comprise daily life.Assuming a decision-maker
wishestomaximizelong-rungains,theyshouldselectaccordingto
expected value (EV): the product of probability and amount, in a
given lottery. However,behavioral economists have demonstrated
that choices during risky decision-making are best described by
a non-linear transformation of both amount and probability val-
ues(KahnemanandTversky,1979).Inparticular,decision-makers
act as if they ﬁnd risk aversive by undervaluing risky gains rela-
tive to their EV. One operational deﬁnition (that we adopt in this
paper)ofriskaversion(RA)iswhendecision-makersselectamore
likely gain with lower EV over a less likely gain with higher EV,on
forced-choice, paired lotteries.
Two psychological explanations for RA have different impli-
cations for potential interventions. One explanation involves a
dual-process tug-of-war between slow deliberation on one side,
and automatic, effortless processing on the other (Epstein, 1994;
Loewenstein et al., 2001). Automatic, predominantly affective
responses to risk (fear or anticipatory regret, for example) are
prepotent in that they drive decisions toward safer options even
when deliberative assessments warrant risk taking (Thaler et al.,
1997;Loewensteinetal.,2001;Slovicetal.,2005).Thusdeliberative
decision-making may depend on cognitive control processes that
facilitate emotion regulation and/or the inhibition of automatic
affective responses to risk.
Another explanation is that the difference between RA
and a balanced assumption of risk hinges on knowledge of,
and experience utilizing, optimal decision-making strategies.
Decision-makers may be risk-averse primarily because they do
not realize that selecting on the basis of EV will yield higher long-
runreturnsthanminimizingriskonindividualdecisions.Instead,
they rely on a sub-optimal strategy like deciding on the basis of
probabilities alone. If RA stems primarily from a lack of knowl-
edge and application of an EV-based decision-making strategy,
then training to promote insight and experience with this strategy
should reduce RA.
Strategy training has improved performance in a variety of
cognitive domains (Hartley and Anderson, 1986; McNamara and
Scott,2001;Saczynskietal.,2002;TouronandHertzog,2004;Pax-
ton et al., 2006; Dunlosky and Kane, 2007), and spontaneous
adaptive strategy shifts have been observed in risky decision-
making contexts (Mata et al., 2007, 2010). However, it has not
been tested whether simply providing explicit instructions and
practice with optimal decision-making strategies can reduce RA.
Even if strategy training reduces RA, cognitive resources may
constrain the efﬁcacy of the intervention. Computing and select-
ing on the basis of EV is more complicated than heuristics like
probabilitymaximization,thusplacinggreaterdemandsonwork-
ing memory. Decision-makers with diminished working memory
may,therefore,makemoremistakeswhentryingtoimplementthe
EV-selectionstrategy.Cognitivecontrolmayalsobeimportantfor
several reasons. According to the dual-process account, delibera-
tive EV-based responding will conﬂict with automatic,risk-averse
responding, and cognitive control processes may be required to
resolve this response conﬂict (Botvinick et al., 2001). It is impor-
tanttonotethatthelack-of-insightanddual-processexplanations
of RA are not mutually exclusive. A decision-maker might be less
www.frontiersin.org May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 68 | 1Westbrook et al. Strategy, aging inﬂuence risky decision-making
risk averse when they have insight about, and practice selecting
based on EV, but only if they can also inhibit automatic response
tendencies, for example, by down-regulating their initial affective
responsetorisk.Cognitivecontrolmayalsoplayanimportantrole
in boosting signals of goal-relevant stimulus features (e.g., EV) in
valuationcentersof thebrainduringdecision-making(Hareetal.,
2009). Hence,even if optimal strategy insight and training reduce
RA,trainingmightbelesseffectivefordecision-makerswitheither
(or both) diminished working memory or cognitive control.
Older adults (OAs) represent one such population. It is well
established that OAs exhibit declines in both working memory
and cognitive control (Salthouse, 1990; Park and Reuter-Lorenz,
2009). Reduced working memory, along with reduced processing
speed,has been shown to explain apparent RA among OAs across
decision-making tasks (Henninger et al.,2010).Another potential
handicap for OAs is an age-related impairment in the cognitive
control function of goal maintenance (Braver and West, 2008).
If overcoming RA depends on goal-directed, top-down biasing
of EV-based selection over prepotent risk avoidance, then success
withthisdecision-makingstrategywillcriticallydependoncogni-
tive control.Yet,OAs frequently exhibit goal neglect: a progressive
tendency to make prepotent, but goal-irrelevant responses over
goal-appropriate ones (Duncan et al., 1996; De Jong, 2001; West,
2002;ButlerandZacks,2006).Thus,OAsareagoodpopulationin
which to test the limitations of strategy training for reducing RA.
In the current study, younger and OAs were assessed for evi-
dence of RA, both before and after explicit strategy training in
EV-based decision-making. The paradigm involved paired lotter-
iesvaryingexplicitlyinrewardmagnitudeandprobability(cf.Holt
and Laury, 2002). We operationalized RA in terms of the propor-
tion of trials in which the lower-risk option was selected when
the other (higher-risk) option had a higher EV. In training, par-
ticipants were instructed to compute and maximize EV and were
given practice and feedback explicitly informative of the EV asso-
ciated with each choice. In the post-training phase, participants
were encouraged to use this EV-based decision-making strategy
and told it would maximize payoffs.
Our primary goal was to determine whether RA results from
a lack of strategy insight and practice, independent of ability to
inhibit affective responses to risk. We predicted that if insight
matters, our strategy training should be effective in reducing RA,
evenwithouttargetingaffectivecontrol.Alternatively,if RAresults
solely from affective responses to risk, then our strategy train-
ing should be ineffective. A secondary goal was to test whether
age-related cognitive decline would limit training efﬁcacy among
OAs. We further predicted that if implementation of an EV-
based decision-strategy critically depends on working memory
or cognitive control, reduced training effects should be observed
in OAs.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants included 40 younger (Mage=21.0, SD=2.5,
range=18–33) and 46 OAs (Mage=75.4, SD=7.4, range=65–
95). Younger adults (YAs) were recruited from the Washing-
ton University in Saint Louis undergraduate community, while
OAs were recruited from the Volunteers for Health community
database. All participants self-reported no history of neurological
orpsychiatricdisease,andprovidedinformedconsentapprovedby
the Human Research Protection Ofﬁce human subject committee
at Washington University in Saint Louis.
PROCEDURE
Participantsperformedapairedlotterytaskthatwasprogrammed
and presented in E-Prime 2.0. At the beginning of the experi-
ment, participants were instructed to make a series of choices
between paired offers worth different point values. Participants
were encouraged to earn as many points as possible since points
would later be converted to real money (at an unspeciﬁed conver-
sion rate). At the end of the experiment, participants were shown
theirtotalpointearnings,toldtheconversionrate,andtheamount
of money they earned, based on their performance (Figure 1).
Participants were given 7.5s during each trial to select between
the paired offers. A sliding bar indicated the time remaining on
each trial. If participants did not make a selection in time, they
received feedback indicating that their response was too slow and
the next trial was presented. Though trials were time-limited,
responses were practically self-paced since 7.5s apparently pro-
videdampletimeformostresponsesforbothyounger(M =3.23s,
SD=1.49s)andOAs(M =4.13s,SD=1.55s).Likewise,speedof
responding was de-emphasized with the ﬁxed response window,
in that faster responses did not increase the rate at which trials
were completed.
Two decision-making blocks were performed in counterbal-
anced order, uninstructed gambling and EV training, followed
by a last decision-making block: instructed gambling. During
uninstructed gambling, participants were permitted to make
their selections by any strategy they wanted in an attempt
to maximize earnings. After participants chose an offer, they
were informed about the outcome: all-or-none points earned
in that trial, and a cumulative total of earnings throughout the
experiment.
In the EV-training block, participants were instructed to prac-
tice computing and maximizing EV. Trial parameters in this block
includedrewardpoints,andapercentageindicatingthefractionof
thosepointsthattheywereguaranteedtoreceive.Theinstructions
were to multiply the points and the percentages (i.e., to explicitly
compute EV for each offer), decide which offer was larger, and
then use this as the basis for their decision. Earnings were always
the precise product (equivalent to EV in an all-or-nothing gam-
ble)of theirchoice.Afterparticipantsdecided,theywereinformed
of the outcome as before: earnings in that trial, and those earned
throughout the experiment.
The last block, instructed gambling, was identical to unin-
structed gambling but was preceded by explicit instructions that
the EV-based selection strategy was in fact optimal and that it
shouldbeconsistentlyappliedduringdecision-makinginorderto
maximize earnings.
INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO INSTRUCTED GAMBLING
Beforestartingtheinstructedgamblingblock,participantsreadthe
followinginstructions.Notethatthesereferredtotheuninstructed
and instructed gambling blocks “Probabilistic” and “Determinis-
tic,”respectively,reﬂecting the key distinction between blocks that
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 68 | 2Westbrook et al. Strategy, aging inﬂuence risky decision-making
FIGURE 1 | During instructed and uninstructed gambling and EV
training, participants choose between paired offers. In gambling
conditions, outcomes are all-or-nothing, while in EV training, they are the
product of percentages and points. In the follow-up study, older adults
received no-feedback as to the outcome of their choices.The option on
the right is highlighted to reﬂect that the participant has chosen that
option and the consequences of that choice are shown to the right of
each arrow.
outcome was either probabilistic or deterministic in relationship
to choice.
SCREEN 1:
Before we begin the next round, we would like to tell you one
more thing. In previous versions of this study, we have found
that people tend to use very different strategies in the Proba-
bilistic and Deterministic conditions. You might have noticed
yourself doing this too!
In the Probabilistic condition, we ﬁnd that most people tend
to choose the higher probability option because it feels “safer,”
whereas in the Deterministic condition people tend to multiply
the probability by the amount on each side and then to choose
the larger.
SCREEN 2:
In fact, people’s tendency to choose the higher probability
reward in the Probabilistic condition usually results in them
earning many fewer points than they could. Mathematically, it
is far better to use the SAME strategy in both conditions. If you
do this, you will tend to earn many more points.
Speciﬁcally, you will tend to make the most points if you treat
theProbabilisticconditionjustliketheDeterministiccondition.
In other words, instead of thinking only about the probability
of winning, you should always multiply the probability by the
amount on each side and choose the larger. Although this may
resultinsmallergainsonsomeindividualturns,overthecourse
of the entire experiment, you will earn many more points.
SCREEN 3:
Now, you will begin doing the PROBABILISTIC version of the
task.However,wewouldlikeyoutousethestrategywejusttold
you about.You should now make all your choices the same way
you would make them in the DETERMINISTIC condition: by
multiplying the probability times the amount for each option,
and choosing the larger. If you do this, you will earn more
points (and hence, more money) than if you used a different
strategy.
T a b l e1|P r obability and amount parameters used to generate the list
of 96 trials experienced by every participant.
Probabilities (%) Magnitudes
LOW-RISK/LOW-REWARD (LL)
50 100
70 200
90 300
100 400
HIGH-RISK/HIGH-REWARD (HH)
10 250
20 500
40 750
60 1000
TRIAL PARAMETERS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DETECTING RA
The same 96 different trials (orthogonal combinations of prob-
abilities and amounts) were used in each of the three blocks
described above,presented in pseudo-random order for each par-
ticipant, and were generated using the following procedure. First,
four levels of probability (expressed in percent likelihood) and
four levels of amount (expressed as points) were selected for low-
risk, low-reward (LL) and high-risk, high-reward (HH) sets of
choice parameters (Table 1). Next, for each set, the probabilities
and amounts were combined factorially, producing 16 different
probability/amount trials for each set. The 16 trials of the LL set
were then crossed with the 16 trials of the HH set, producing 256
possible trials.
Because practical constraints precluded presentation of all 256
trials in each experimental condition, a subset of 96 trials were
selected according to the following criteria. First, the 256 trials
were sorted based on the absolute difference in EVs between the
two decks. Values ranged from 0 (identical EVs for both decks)
to 550 (one deck had an EV 550 points greater than the other).
A majority of the 100 trials with the lowest absolute difference
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(range =0–110 points) were selected for inclusion in the ﬁnal set
of 96 trials. These trials represented relatively “difﬁcult” choices,
i.e., trials on which the EV of one option was not substantially
larger than the other (though there was still substantial variability
across trials). The rest of the 96 trials were deliberately selected to
(a) have a relatively large difference in EVs between the two sets
and (b) roughly equate the number of trials in which each para-
meterlevelwaspresented(e.g.,roughlythesamenumberof offers
involving probabilities of 10,20,40%,etc.). By this method,all 96
trialsinvolvedapairingfromadistributionofLL(highprobability,
Hi Prob) values (point range =100–400, M =237.5; probability
range=50–100%,M =78.5%),whiletheotherinvolvedapairing
from a set of HH (lower-probability) values (point range =250–
1000,M =622.4; probability range=10–60%,M =31.4%). Care
wasalsotakentoensurethatthetwosets(LLandHH)wereclosely
matched in mean EV (MLL =187,MHH =183).
In a critical subset of trials (38 of 96), which we refer to as
conﬂict (CF) trials, EV was higher in one option while probabil-
ity was higher in the other option (e.g., 90% chance of winning
200 points vs. 20% chance of winning 1000). Thus, choosing the
Hi Prob option on these trials represents a clear case of RA. In
the remainder of the trials, the low-risk option had either equal
(EQ) or higher EV than the high-risk option (thus termed non-
conﬂict; NC). Consequently,these trials are non-diagnostic of the
particular decision-strategy employed by participants. However,
they were included as buffer trials, to make the conﬂict present
in conﬂict trials less obvious to participants, and to increase the
variation of probabilities, rewards, and EVs present across trials.
The analyses reported below focused on performance within the
conﬂict trials,except where otherwise noted.
RESULTS
All 96 trials, the average rate of RA on each trial in uninstructed
gambling, and the average RA rate in instructed gambling (after
the training) are given in the Table A1 in Appendix.
BASIC TRAINING EFFECTS
To determine whether strategy training was effective at reducing
RA, we performed a 2×2×2 Block (instructed vs. uninstructed
gambling)×Order (uninstructed gambling before EV training or
vice versa)×Age (OAs vs. YAs) ANOVA. The dependent mea-
surewastheRArate(i.e.,proportionof conﬂicttrialsinwhichthe
low-riskoptionwaschoseninsteadofthehigh-EVoption).Results
revealed a main effect of instruction block [F(2, 86)=90.34,
p<0.01] (Figure 2). RA rate was lower in instructed gambling
(0.31) than uninstructed gambling (0.55). Thus,training was suc-
cessful in reducing RA by promoting EV-based decision-making.
Moreover, the effect was signiﬁcant in each group separately [YA:
F(1, 38)=100.39, p<0.01, OA: F(1, 44)=10.95, p<0.01], indi-
cating its robustness. Block order did not interact with the block
effect [F(1, 82)=2.37, p =0.13], nor was the three-way interac-
tion(Age×Order×Block)signiﬁcant[F(1,82)=0.11,p =0.74].
Importantly, strategic insight generated a signiﬁcant reduction in
RA from uninstructed to instructed gambling (the main effect of
Block) even for the subset of participants who practiced EV-based
selectionbeforebaselineuninstructedgambling[i.e.,forthosepar-
ticipantswhoﬁrstgambledafterpracticingEV-basedselection,but
FIGURE 2 | Inﬂuence of age and EV-strategy training and instruction on
average rate of RA. Strategy practice and instruction reduces RA but less
so among older adults.
before being told EV-based selection could be used to maximize
outcomes in gambling; F(1, 42)=28.96, p<0.01]. Comparing
means in each Order group, uninstructed gambling RA was not
signiﬁcantly lower after EV training rather than before it [unin-
structed gambling before EV training: RA=0.58; uninstructed
gambling after EV training: RA=0.51; t(84)=1.62, p =0.11].
These results suggest that practice computing EV has little effect
on RA, and that the critical factor in optimizing decision-making
is the qualitative insight provided by the explicit instructional
manipulation.
Although the training effect was signiﬁcant in both age groups,
there was also a signiﬁcant main effect of Age [F(1, 82)=13.28,
p<0.01], and an Age×Block interaction [F(1, 82)=24.33,
p<0.01] revealing that strategy training was less effective in OAs
comparedtoYAs.AverageRAintheinstructedgamblingblockwas
higher for OAs (0.44) than YAs [0.19; t(85)=−6.11, p<0.01],
despite the fact that RA was identical in the two groups dur-
ing uninstructed gambling (OA: RA=0.55,YA:RA=0.55; t<1).
Based on these results, we conducted a series of analyses to better
understand both why training reduced RA in both groups, and
also why EV training was less effective for OAs.
POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS OF TRAINING EFFECTS
TrainingwassuccessfulinreducingRA,butthiscouldhaveresulted
fromsomecombinationofincreasedrelianceonEV,asthetraining
was designed to promote, or increased ability to inhibit the auto-
maticaffectiveresponsetorisk.Intheformercase,EV-relatedtrial
parameters should become more important predictors of choice
aftertraining.Inthelattercase,choiceprobabilitiesshouldbecome
less important predictors of choice after training since choice
probabilities presumably drive the automatic affective response.
A multiple regression was conducted to test the inﬂuence of
trial-by-trial parameters on choice. Speciﬁcally, we tested the
extenttowhichEV-relatedorRA-relatedpredictorvariablescould
predict the pattern of choice on each trial out of the full set of 96
decision trials (indexed by t) performed by participants (Eq. 1).
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For this analysis, the dependent measure was the proportion of
participants (indexed by i) choosing the Hi Prob option. Because
each participant received the exact same 96 trials but in permuted
order, it is possible to treat the choice pattern across the 96 trials,
averaged across participants, as an independent random effect.
Two trial-level predictors were selected as independent variables:
the probability value of the Hi Prob option, and the difference
in EV between the Hi Prob and low probability options (i.e.,
ΔEV=EV Hi Prob option−EV low probability option; −/+ for
conﬂict/non-conﬂict trials). These two predictor variables were
chosen out of a set of three potential RA-related variables and
threepotentialEV-relatedvariablesonthebasisof relativereliabil-
ity. Prior to inclusion the two trial-level predictors were z-scored,
while the dependent variable was logit-transformed and then z-
scored. Note that for the purpose of transforming proportions
of 1 (e.g., where all participants selected the Hi Prob option
on a non-conﬂict trial), a small constant, equal to the smallest,
non-zero proportion value across all trials (0.025) was added
to the numerator and denominator of the logit function. This
ad hoc solution is recommended for logit transformations while
introducing minimal bias (Warton and Hui, 2011).
logit
⎛
⎝
 kj,m,t
i=1 RA responsesi,j,m,t
kj,m,t
⎞
⎠
= β0 + β1Hi Probj,m,t + β2ΔEVj,m,t + β3Blockj,m,t
+ β4ΔEVj,m,t × Blockj,m,t + β4Hi Probj,m,t
× Blockj,m,t + εj,m,t (1)
The ﬁrst analysis focused on YAs (age-group indexed by m;
here m =younger adults), since this was the group showing the
largesteffectsofstrategytrainingintheinstructedrelativetounin-
structed gambling block. To determine the source of this effect,
we compared performance on both blocks of the task (indexed
by j), examining block-related effects by including a dummy-
coded block predictor variable in the analysis (Blockj,m,t =−1/1
for uninstructed/instructed gambling, respectively), with addi-
tional predictor variables coding for the interaction of block with
the Hi Prob and ΔEV trial-level variables. The results of this mul-
tiple regression analysis are presented in Table 2. Both the RA and
EV-related parameters were found to be signiﬁcant predictors of
choice. Critically, however, training increased the inﬂuence of the
EV-relatedpredictor(asevidencedbythesigniﬁcantΔEV×Block
interaction), but had no effect on the inﬂuence of the RA-related
variable (the Hi Prob×Block interaction). This ﬁnding is consis-
tentwiththehypothesisthatstrategytrainingwaseffectivebecause
it promoted a goal of EV-based selection rather than promoting
general affective control.
POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS OF AGING EFFECTS
A second multiple regression analysis (Eq. 2) was conducted to
examinethesourceof agedifferences(ageindexedbym)thatwere
observedintheinstructedgamblingblock(blockindexedbyj;here
j =instructed gambling), which indicated increased RA among
OAs (participant indexed by i) on all 96 trials (trial indexed by
t).We tested whether this apparent increased RA in OAs might be
duerelativeinabilitytocontroltheaffectiveresponsetorisk,which
should be reﬂected in a relatively greater inﬂuence of Hi Prob, the
RA-related predictor variable. Speciﬁcally, a plausible hypothesis
is that relatively greater sensitivity to the affective consequences of
risk among OAs interfered with their attempts to select based on
EV in instructed gambling. To examine this hypothesis we com-
paredperformanceof theOAsandYAsintheinstructedgambling
condition, examining age effects by including a dummy-coded
age-group predictor variable in the analysis (Agej,m,t =−1/1 for
YA/OAs, respectively), with additional predictor variables coding
for the interaction of age group with the Hi Prob and ΔEV trial-
level variables. The results of this regression analysis are presented
in Table 3.
logit
⎛
⎝
 kj,m,t
i=1 RA responsesi,j,m,t
kj,m,t
⎞
⎠
= β0 + β1Hi Probj,m,t + β2ΔEVj,m,t + β3Agej,m,t
+ β4ΔEVj,m,t × Agej,m,t + β4Hi Probj,m,t
× Agej,m,t + εj,m,t (2)
This analysis provided no support for the affective response to
risk hypothesis of aging effects. Although Hi Prob,the RA-related
predictor, remained signiﬁcant in the instructed gambling block,
Table 2 | Multiple regression of standardized, logit-transformed
proportion of high probability choices among kj,young,t ≤40 younger
adults on 96 independent trials with one RA-related predictor (the
probability of the high probability option, Hi Prob), one EV-related
predictor (the difference in EVs: ΔEV), and a dummy variable for block.
Term β SE tp
Hi Prob 0.20 0.04 4.68 <0.01
ΔEV 0.69 0.04 15.96 <0.01
Block −0.26 0.04 −6.22 <0.01
ΔEV×block 0.21 0.04 4.97 <0.01
Hi Prob×block −0.01 0.04 −0.20 0.84
Trial-level predictors were z-scored. N=2×96=192 (blocks×trials per block).
Table 3 | Multiple regression of the standardized, logit-transformed
proportion of high probability choices on 96 independent trials in the
instructed gambling block by k younger or older adults, with one
RA-related predictor (Hi Prob), one EV-related predictor (ΔEV), and a
dummy-coded age variable.
Term β SE tp
Hi Prob 0.17 0.05 3.69 <0.01
ΔEV 0.70 0.05 14.46 <0.01
Age 0.15 0.05 3.31 <0.01
ΔEV×age −0.30 0.05 −6.47 <0.01
Hi Prob×age −0.04 0.05 −0.80 0.43
Trial-level parameters were z-scored. kj,m,t ≤40/46 for younger/older adults.
N=2×96=192 (age groups×trials per group).
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there was no interaction of this variable with age group. This sug-
gests that the Hi Prob had no greater inﬂuence over choice in
OAs. In contrast, a signiﬁcant interaction of ΔEV and age was
observed, the sign of which reﬂected reduced EV inﬂuence on
choice among OAs. Thus, the results suggest that the apparent
age-related increase in RA during the instructed gambling block
was not due to a greater inﬂuence of probability on choice, but
instead to the reduced inﬂuence of EV-related information in this
age group, after explicit strategy training and instruction.
Another key prediction of the affective interference account
is that more frequent (negative) feedback promotes risk-averse
behavior (cf. Thaler et al., 1997). Thus, OAs might have shown
reduced training effects because these were counteracted by
experiences with negative feedback when selecting high-risk
options. We tested for feedback effects by conducting a follow-
up study with a second group of OAs (N =40; Mage =74.0,
SD=6.1, range=66–88) who experienced the exact same para-
digm and procedure but without trial-by-trial feedback regard-
ing decision outcome eliminated in the last, post-training block
(i.e., instructed gambling). Comparing the effect of training on
RA in the two older adult groups in a 2×2 Training (unin-
structed gambling vs. instructed gambling)×Feedback Group
(present vs. absent) ANOVA, demonstrated that the main effect
of training was still present [F(1 ,84)=29.25, p<0.01, RA:
Muninstructed =0.54, Minstructed =0.39], but there was neither a
signiﬁcant main effect of Feedback [F(1,84)=2.18,p =0.14,RA:
Mno-feedback =0.43,Mfeedback =0.49]norBlock×Feedbackinter-
action [F(1, 84)=2.14, p =0.15]. Likewise, when comparing the
no-feedback older adult group with the YAs, we replicated the
Block×Age interaction observed in the original analysis [F(1,
78)=8.02,p<0.01].
Alternative explanations for OAs’ relatively higher RA after
training include: an age-related impairment in the ability to com-
puteandcompareEVs,andanage-relatedbiastowardaprobability
(as opposed to amount) maximization heuristic, independent of
EV. Because the training block explicitly required participants to
computeandselectonthebasisofEV,weusedparticipants’average
performance in this block as a measure of their EV-computation
ability in a hierarchical regression analysis of individual RA in
instructedgambling(Table 4).Wealsoincludedtheirfrequencyof
selecting the Hi Prob option on EQ trials as yet another predictor,
reasoning that it represents a measure of how much participants’
decisions are biased by probability (as opposed to amount) when
their preference regarding EV is neutralized. This predictor was
added after the EV-selection ability measure since a decision-
maker would have to compute EV correctly to know that that
choice dimension was irrelevant on a given equivalence trial.
As expected, EV-computation ability explained a signiﬁcant
component of between-participants variance in average (aver-
aged across an individual’s choices) instructed gambling RA when
controlling for baseline RA (in uninstructed gambling). Also,
the bias to select based on probability (as measured by the ten-
dency to select the Hi Prob option on EQ trials) in instructed
gambling explained a signiﬁcant amount of variance when con-
trolling for baseline RA and EV-computation ability. Impor-
tantly, however, age was still a signiﬁcant predictor of RA dur-
ing instructed gambling even after controlling for uninstructed
Table 4 | Hierarchical regression analysis of alternative explanations of
relatively higher RA among older adults in instructed gambling
including EV-selection ability and probability-based selection bias.
β SE t adj R2 ΔR2
STEP 1
Baseline (uninstructed) RA 0.26 0.11 2.46* 0.07 –
STEP 2
EV-computation ability
(EV-training block accuracy)
0.53 0.09 5.82** 0.32 0.25**
STEP 3
Probability-based selection
bias (EQ high-probability
choice)
0.35 0.08 4.11** 0.43 0.11**
STEP 4
Age 0.86 0.15 5.73** 0.59 0.16**
*p<0.05; **p<0.01.
The dependent variable is the proportion of RA choices on conﬂict trials
in instructed gambling across both age groups. All proportion data is logit-
transformed then standardized. Age is dummy coded (−1/1 for younger/older
adults).
gambling RA, EV-selection ability, and probability-based selec-
tion bias. This implies that even though EV-selection ability
and probability-based selection bias constrained training efﬁ-
cacy, they do not fully explain the age differences in training
effects.
AGING AND GOAL NEGLECT
OurpreferredinterpretationofOAs’increasedpropensitytorevert
to RA after training is that it reﬂects goal neglect, rather than
affective interference, impaired EV-selection abilities, or some
other bias to select on the single dimension of probability. The
goal-neglect account suggests that even in the absence of active
interference, OAs are more likely to commit goal-inconsistent
behavior because their goal representations are particularly prone
toprogressive,butpassivedecay,whennotsupportedbytheirenvi-
ronment (Duncan et al., 1996). A key prediction of this account
is a decreasing tendency to select on the basis of EV, and a cor-
responding increase in RA, throughout the instructed gambling
block. We tested this by computing the correlation between trial
numberandRA(Figure3).AmongOAs,asigniﬁcantpositivecor-
relation was observed (r =0.33, p<0.01), while in YAs no such
correlation was present (r =−0.03, p =0.77). That is, selectively
for OAs,there was a greater tendency to exhibit RA on conﬂict tri-
als encountered later rather than earlier in the block (i.e., farther
removed from training and instructions). The positive correla-
tion was also obtained in the second, independent, sample of
OAs who received no-feedback (r =0.20, p=0.049), providing
further evidence that OAs’ relative failure to maintain the goal of
EV-based selection results from passive decay, rather than active
feedback-related interference.
An alternative explanation for the steady rise in RA rates
among OAs in the instructed gambling block, and one that we
believe is incorrect, is that OAs were selectively fatigued by 96
consecutive decisions and thus were simply making more errors
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FIGURE 3 | Correlation of average RA rate and trial number for
conﬂict trials in instructed gambling. Signiﬁcant positive correlations
obtain for older adults (OA) but not younger adults (YA), suggesting a
goal-neglect effect among OA only.That the positive correlation obtains
for OA under both feedback and no-feedback conditions implies that a
passive process like goal neglect is a better explanation of the
correlations than active interference by affective responses to negative
feedback.
as each block progressed. We do not believe this to be the cor-
rect explanation for multiple reasons. First, if OAs are prone to
fatigue across 96 consecutive trials,we would expect to observe an
increasing error rate across the 96 trials of the EV-training block,
since in this participants are also explicitly instructed to engage
in effortful EV computation. Instead of increasing errors, how-
ever, the error rate gradually decreased among OAs during EV
training (r =−0.35, p<0.01). Thus, rather than fatigue effects,
OAsshowedevidenceofimprovement,reﬂectiveofpracticeeffects
across the block.
An analysis of response times (RTs) also provides evidence
against a fatigue account. Instead, it supports the goal-neglect
consistent explanation that OAs attempted to implement the
EV-selection strategy throughout the block, even though their
resulting decisions were progressively less biased by their goal
to select on the basis of EV. RT analyses are complicated by the
fact that participants were not encouraged to respond rapidly,but
instead given ample time to respond. However, it is still possible
to make predictions regarding the RTs trends expected if partic-
ipants were becoming fatigued. The average RT to conﬂict trials
amongOAswasslowerininstructed(4489ms)comparedtounin-
structed gambling [4101ms; t(189)=−8.21, p<0.01], implying
that,asexpected,themorecomplicatedEV-selectionstrategytook
longer to implement. If OAs suffered fatigue, their RTs should
have either progressively increased, as they took still longer to
implement the strategy,or progressively decreased,if they instead
relinquished the more taxing strategy and utilized the simpler
probabilitymaximizationheuristic.However,weobservedneither
of these trends. Instead, RTs on conﬂict trials were uncorrelated
with trial number among OAs (r =−0.05, p =0.701). Impor-
tantly, this stands in contrast to RT trends on the other two trial
types, NC (r =−0.19, p =0.06) and EQ (r =−0.28, p<0.01),
bothof whichshowedaprogressivedropinRTs,reﬂectiveof prac-
tice effects. Taken together, these two ﬁndings are inconsistent
with a fatigue account: (a) OAs slowed down after EV instruc-
tion and then maintained this slowing on conﬂict trials, while
(b) showing a progressive speeding on non-conﬂict and equiva-
lencetrials,demonstratingthatRTsaresensitivetopracticeeffects
occurring on some trials. The RT results are most consistent
with the interpretation that OAs continued to treat conﬂict tri-
als as a special case, despite the fact that they were increasingly
likely to make the RA choice as the trials progressed. In other
words,we suggest that OAs attempted utilize the EV-computation
strategy throughout the instructed gambling block; however, as
predicted by goal neglect, their behavior became progressively
less biased by the goal to actually make selections on the basis
of EV.
DISCUSSION
Our results have two important implications for understanding
RA. First, we show that RA can be explained in terms of a lack-
of-insight regarding which decision-making strategy to employ
to maximize returns. Simply orienting participants to the opti-
mal EV-based strategy substantially reduced RA, without any
effort to down-regulate automatic, affective biases. Conversely,
mere practice at mental computation and selection of EV was
not sufﬁcient to reduce RA, demonstrating that the root prob-
lem was not an inability or unwillingness to mentally compute
EV, but a failure to apply this as an optimal strategy. If prac-
tice was sufﬁcient, then a signiﬁcant reduction in RA should
have occurred after the EV-training block, even before receiv-
ing explicit instructions. However, we found that the block order
of EV training did not signiﬁcantly affect the amount of beneﬁt
obtained by explicit instruction. Conscious insight obtained by
explicit instruction was necessary to enable robust implementa-
tion of the newly practiced strategy. By suggesting that practice
is insufﬁcient to ameliorate RA, we leave open the possibility
that spontaneous insight into the nature of the task acquired in
the course of practice might indeed exert such a shift in strat-
egy. In an independent set of data (Yarkoni, T., and Braver, T.
S., in preparation), we have in fact observed an effect of block
order that appears to be attributable to some participants sponta-
neously realizing that they can apply a maximizing strategy across
multiple conditions. The critical point is that it is the strategic
insight and not the practice at computing EV that is the essential
element.
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Second, the gradual return to risk-averse decision-making
among OAs appeared to reﬂect passive decay of goal represen-
tations rather than the biasing effects of feedback toward affective
responding. The complete removal of feedback did not have a sig-
niﬁcant effect on the amount of RA (though there was a slight
numerical reduction) observed among a second group of OAs in
a follow-up study. On the other hand, OAs displayed increasing
RA for decisions farther removed from training, suggesting pas-
sive decay of representations of the goal to select on the basis
of EV. The progressive rise occurred independent of feedback,
demonstrating that cumulative feedback effects did not cause it.
TheprogressiveriseinRAwasalsospeciﬁctoOAs;YAsshowedno
gradual decay in performance, consistent with the idea that OAs
areparticularlysusceptibletogoalneglectandthebroadercontext
of age-relateddeclineincognitivecontrol(Duncanetal.,1996;De
Jong,2001;West,2002;Nieuwenhuis et al.,2004;Braver andWest,
2008).
Ourstudyalsoaddstothegrowingliteratureexaminingtherole
of cognitive factors in older adult decision-making. Prior work
has suggested that OAs tend to adopt simpler, less-demanding
decision-making strategies (Kim et al., 2005; Rafaely et al., 2006;
Peters et al., 2007), and that this might be explained in terms
of age-related declines in ﬂuid intelligence (Mata et al., 2007).
Concomitantly, the mixed ﬁndings regarding whether aging is
associatedwithincreasedRAperse (Droretal.,1998;Bellanteand
Green,2004; Deakin et al.,2004; Denburg et al.,2005;s e eMather,
2006) have led some to argue that RA depends more on decision-
makers’cognitivecapacitiesandthenatureofthedecision-making
task, than on inherent effects of age. For example, a recent meta-
analysis (Mata et al., 2011), found that age-related differences in
risk preference tend to disappear when decision-makers are pro-
vided with explicit probability information as opposed to when
theymustlearnaboutprobabilitiesthroughexperience.Ourﬁnd-
ing of equivalent baseline RA across age groups is consistent
with this literature, since our task involves explicit probability
information. Another recent study emphasized the role of the
decision-makers’ cognitive capacities rather than age by demon-
strating that OAs can evince both relatively elevated risk seeking
and elevated RA across tasks with different demands, and that
outcomes are mediated by processing speed and working mem-
ory (Henninger et al.,2010). Our results agree in that under naïve
conditionsthatarelikelypromotelow-demand,heuristicdecision
strategies, OAs exhibit equivalent levels of RA to YAs. It was only
whenthetaskemphasizedthecognitivelydemandingEV-selection
strategy that age-related differences in RA emerged. Nevertheless,
even though reduced cognitive capacities, such as working mem-
ory, may have limited the effectiveness of EV-strategy training in
OAs, the data suggest it is not a full account of age differences,
since these were present even after controlling for EV-selection
ability.
These ﬁndings have important implications for both the the-
oretical understanding and practical remediation of decision-
making deﬁcits in OAs. If, as we have argued, such deﬁcits
result in part from passive decay of goal representations, efforts
to improve older adult decision-making should focus on devel-
oping interventions that emphasize environmental support and
contextual information, and not affect regulation. Evidence for
the potentially important role of environmental support can be
found in a recent study of risky decision-making (Samanez-
Larkin et al., 2011). In this study, one condition provided a visual
representation of the running EV of options, thereby furnish-
ing continuous, if implicit, environmental support for an EV-
selection strategy. Under this condition, performance improved
for both older and YAs, with the older group matching YAs’
baseline performance. Unlike our study, however, they did not
instruct participants which strategy to use. Instead, participants
came to utilize EV signals through reinforcement learning, an
approach taken throughout much of the risky decision-making
literature. The advantage of explicit insight is that decision-
makers in the real world are more commonly presented with
single, one-off decisions for which the application of decontextu-
alized, abstract decision strategies may be crucial. If individuals
can be given insight, and supported by their environment to
apply EV-selection strategies whenever they encounter a risky
decision, they might make better choices even in entirely novel
decisions.
Our account of the strategy training effects and putative goal
neglect among OAs during instructed gambling implies speciﬁc
predictions regarding neural mechanisms that could be tested
in future imaging studies. One prediction that follows from our
interpretationisthatcognitivecontrolprocessesrelatedtotask-set
(goal)maintenancewillbeengagedpreferentiallyintheinstructed
gambling block in order to implement the EV-selection strat-
egy. Thus, we would expect to see a neural signature of this
strategy in frontoparietal cognitive control networks. Indeed, in
preliminary data from YAs, increased frontoparietal activity was
observed when comparing the EV-training condition to unin-
structed gambling (Yarkoni, 2010). We would further expect this
pattern when comparing instructed to uninstructed gambling. A
particular region of interest might be the anterior prefrontal cor-
tex (aPFC). Sustained activity in this region has been thought
to reﬂect abstract (or higher-order) task-set maintenance (Braver
and Bongiolatti, 2002; Braver et al., 2003; Sakai, 2008). In the
context of decision-making, increased sustained activity in aPFC
has been observed when decision strategies needed to be main-
tained across a temporally extended interval (Yarkoni et al.,2005).
Thus,wepredictincreasedsustainedactivityinaPFCininstructed
compared to uninstructed gambling, but similar activity in EV
practice and instructed gambling. Further, the degree of similar-
ity between EV practice and instructed gambling should predict
behavioral ﬁndings of greater EV maximization during instructed
gambling.
Brain activity dynamics can also provide a convergent test
of our account of the age-related ﬁndings observed here. As
the behavioral signature of goal neglect was a progressive rise
in RA, the neural signature of goal neglect would be a pro-
gressive decay in sustained aPFC activity, reﬂecting the loss of
task-set. Such a ﬁnding would be consistent with prior work,
whichdemonstratedareductioninsustainedaPFCactivityamong
OAs during task-switching, a pattern that was also interpreted
as impaired task-set maintenance (Jimura and Braver, 2010).
Finally, it would be useful to examine activity dynamics in brain
regions responsive to risk and negative feedback (e.g., insula,
amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex; Kahn et al., 2002; Kuhnen
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience May 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 68 | 8Westbrook et al. Strategy, aging inﬂuence risky decision-making
and Knutson, 2005; Brown and Braver, 2007). Our interpretation
of the results is that training and age effects are not due to
an altered response to risk and/or negative feedback; thus, we
predict that these regions would be active during the gambling
conditions (but not EV training, which eliminates the risk com-
ponent of decision-making), and would show equivalent activity
in younger and OAs, along with no decrease in activity among
these regions when comparing in instructed to uninstructed gam-
bling. Together, this pattern of imaging results would provide
strong support that an interaction of insight and age-related cog-
nitive control processes, such as task-set maintenance, are what
differentiate age groups, but not necessarily the affective response
to risk.
Our preferred interpretation of the steady return to RA among
OAs is age-related goal neglect. Other interpretations are possible,
however. OAs may have evinced increasing RA because they pro-
gressivelyabandonedtheEV-selectionstrategyforotherunknown
reasons. For example, it may have been an intentional decision
(instead of an implicit one, based on goal maintenance difﬁ-
culties), made because of progressive discomfort with utilizing
the novel instructed strategy, relative to their greater familiar-
ity and experience in using more heuristic, risk-based decision-
making strategies. OAs may have experienced this familiarity
asymmetrybetweenexperienced-basedandtheinstructedstrategy
more acutely than YAs, given their longer life-time of experi-
ence. However, we did assess compliance with the instructions
in a post-experiment debrieﬁng questionnaire, and there was no
indication of any participant intentionally switching strategies
during the instructed gambling block. Indeed, most participants
explicitly reported utilizing the instructed strategy throughout
the whole block (in a few cases the question was either not
answered, the answer was ambiguous, or, in the case of one
participant, the instructions were misunderstood). Nevertheless,
in future studies, it may be useful to examine this issue more
systematically.
Arelatedaccount,andonethatwasnotconsideredinourorig-
inal design, relates to the age-dependent experience of arousal
and emotion regulation. OAs tend to experience arousing stim-
uli as more aversive than YAs (Keil and Freund, 2009). Despite
their relatively enhanced emotion regulation strategies, sustained
durations of emotional distress may be more difﬁcult for OAs
to overcome (for a review, see Charles, 2010). If selecting the
riskier (low probability) option on conﬂict trials causes arousal
in a way that OAs ﬁnd increasingly aversive and difﬁcult to cope
with, they may have found the instructed strategy more discom-
forting to implement, and instead would develop an accumulat-
ing bias against the high-EV option, as it acquires a punishing
character. This would be true even for the group of OAs who
received no-feedback (and therefore no error signals), because
the arousal associated with greater risk taking itself is aversive.
However, if OAs are sensitive to the negative valence of arousal
associated with risk taking in this paradigm, it is unclear why
they would not also be sensitive to the valence consequences of
feedback. The fact that feedback did not inﬂuence OAs’RA there-
fore implies that affective consequences of arousal were not the
primary driver of RA among OAs. Nevertheless, more rigorously
determining whether the age-related experience of arousal inﬂu-
enced decision-making for OAs would require independent mea-
sures of arousal, which were not collected. Hence we cannot
rule out that arousal-related aversion to risk taking contributed
to what we believe to be age-related goal neglect. The mecha-
nisms that contribute to goal neglect are themselves not fully
understood. It is thus possible that goal neglect could be inﬂu-
enced by reinforcement learning (as from punishing arousal)
about co-existing, competing goals. Future study is required to
understand how aversive arousal may contribute to goal neglect
among OAs.
Finally, while we have explained the efﬁcacy of our insight
manipulation in terms of task-sets and the proper weighting of
choice dimensions (probability and amount in EV), we note that
our results could also be accounted for by the behavioral eco-
nomic theory of “narrow framing”(Barberis et al., 2006; Barberis
and Huang, 2009). Narrow framing means that the consequences
of a gamble are considered in isolation rather than in the context
of the decision-maker’s overall risk proﬁle (including, for exam-
ple, their income and housing risks). According to the theory, a
decision-maker may avoid an independent, actuarially favorable
gamble because they do not weigh the beneﬁt of diversifying their
risk portfolio, focusing instead on the potential regret associated
withlosingthegamble.Whileourresultsareconsistentwithhelp-
ing participants overcome narrow framing,our manipulation was
directed at changing participants’ task construal such that they
selectonthebasisof EV.Wedidnotexplicitlymanipulatewhether
participantswereinstructedtoselectchoicesinthecontextoftheir
overall risk proﬁle. Other studies that have done so have found
signiﬁcant changes in individuals’risk preference parameters. For
example, van der Heijden et al. (2011) incited decision-makers to
consider multiple gambles at once and found a reduction in RA
relative to when they considered single gambles in isolation, con-
sistent with the narrow framing theory. Similarly, Guiso (2009)
saw a reduction in RA when participants were asked to consider
their future income probability distribution prior to considering
a gamble. Future work may consider whether our manipulation
promoting a strategy of EV-based selection is convergent with the
economic concept of narrow framing.
Theprimaryconclusionofourstudyisthatinsightandstrategy
training can yield better decision-making, but the beneﬁts may
be constrained by age-related factors that impact the decision-
maker’s ability or willingness to implement the trained strategy.
We hypothesize that one important factor to consider is cognitive
control and goal maintenance ability. If correct, this hypothesis
suggests that apparent RA might manifest under situations in
which cognitive control demands drive decision-making. In con-
trast, under naïve situations, RA may reﬂect most prominently
a lack of knowledge about which strategies are optimal and a
lack of practice in implementing them. The beneﬁts of insight
were not trivial in our paradigm. Knowing about EV-selection
prompted many more decision-makers to take calculated risks. To
illustrate,consider a decision between a 90% chance of 200 points
and a 20% chance of 1000 points. Prior to training, 56 out of 86
(65%)decision-makerschosethe200-point“safe-bet.”Aftertrain-
ing, that number reduced to 23, with 73% of participants (63 out
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of 86) instead preferring the riskier (but higher EV) 1000-point
option. Our ﬁndings suggest that the role of strategy and insight
in decision-making under risk have been underappreciated, and
could lead to the development of new intervention programs
designed to remediate decision-making deﬁcits in both younger
and older adults.
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APPENDIX
TableA1 | Parameters for each of the 96 trials as well as average rate of risk aversion on each trial both in uninstructed gambling (UG) and
instructed gambling (IG), after the training;Trial types include conﬂict (CF), Non-conﬂict (NC), for which the high expected value option also has
the higher probability, and Equivalence (EQ) trials for which the expected value of the two options is equivalent.
Trial type Low-risk High-risk Older adults Younger adults
Prob. Amt. Prob. Amt. UG IG Change in RA* UG IG Change in RA*
CF 1 100 0.2 750 0.54 0.49 −0.05 0.85 0.23 −0.63
CF 0.7 100 0.2 500 0.65 0.41 −0.24 0.73 0.15 −0.58
CF 0.7 300 0.4 750 0.68 0.47 −0.21 0.73 0.18 −0.55
CF 0.7 100 0.4 250 0.57 0.50 −0.07 0.75 0.20 −0.55
CF 1 100 0.6 250 0.57 0.55 −0.03 0.75 0.21 −0.54
CF 0.7 100 0.1 750 0.51 0.49 −0.02 0.78 0.23 −0.54
CF 0.7 100 0.2 750 0.57 0.36 −0.20 0.65 0.13 −0.53
CF 0.9 200 0.4 500 0.57 0.41 −0.17 0.68 0.15 −0.53
CF 0.9 200 0.2 1000 0.60 0.34 −0.26 0.70 0.18 −0.53
CF 0.9 100 0.4 250 0.53 0.51 −0.02 0.85 0.35 −0.50
CF 0.9 100 0.2 500 0.64 0.53 −0.11 0.70 0.20 −0.50
CF 0.7 400 0.4 750 0.68 0.70 0.01 0.78 0.31 −0.47
CF 0.7 100 0.1 1000 0.46 0.28 −0.18 0.55 0.10 −0.45
CF 0.9 400 0.4 1000 0.53 0.38 −0.15 0.50 0.08 −0.43
CF 0.9 100 0.2 1000 0.40 0.41 0.01 0.48 0.05 −0.43
CF 0.7 200 0.2 750 0.72 0.47 −0.26 0.78 0.38 −0.40
CF 1 300 0.4 1000 0.50 0.67 0.17 0.55 0.15 −0.40
CF 0.9 300 0.4 1000 0.49 0.30 −0.19 0.45 0.08 −0.38
CF 0.9 100 0.1 1000 0.59 0.48 −0.11 0.50 0.13 −0.38
CF 0.7 200 0.2 1000 0.55 0.37 −0.18 0.43 0.08 −0.35
CF 0.5 100 0.2 750 0.44 0.65 0.21 0.45 0.10 −0.35
CF 0.9 300 0.6 500 0.68 0.49 −0.19 0.68 0.40 −0.28
CF 0.5 200 0.2 1000 0.50 0.33 −0.17 0.38 0.10 −0.28
CF 0.5 100 0.2 500 0.45 0.36 −0.09 0.38 0.10 −0.28
CF 0.5 300 0.2 1000 0.50 0.46 −0.04 0.35 0.08 −0.28
CF 0.9 300 0.4 750 0.72 0.64 −0.09 0.83 0.55 −0.28
CF 0.9 400 0.6 750 0.61 0.62 0.01 0.73 0.46 −0.26
CF 0.7 200 0.6 250 0.72 0.68 −0.04 0.68 0.43 −0.25
CF 0.7 200 0.4 1000 0.43 0.24 −0.19 0.28 0.03 −0.25
CF 0.7 400 0.4 1000 0.49 0.43 −0.06 0.30 0.05 −0.25
CF 0.5 300 0.4 500 0.40 0.28 −0.12 0.28 0.08 −0.20
EQ 1 200 0.4 500 0.76 0.72 −0.03 0.88 0.68 −0.20
CF 0.7 400 0.6 500 0.45 0.30 −0.14 0.58 0.38 −0.19
EQ 1 300 0.6 500 0.83 0.81 −0.02 0.93 0.75 −0.18
EQ 1 100 0.2 500 0.76 0.77 0.01 0.88 0.70 −0.18
CF 0.6 250 0.5 400 0.49 0.16 −0.33 0.23 0.05 −0.18
EQ 0.5 200 0.1 1000 0.74 0.60 −0.14 0.63 0.45 −0.18
EQ 0.5 200 0.2 500 0.68 0.81 0.13 0.85 0.68 −0.17
EQ 0.6 250 0.5 300 0.47 0.43 −0.03 0.60 0.44 −0.16
CF 0.9 100 0.4 1000 0.48 0.38 −0.10 0.18 0.03 −0.15
EQ 0.5 300 0.2 750 0.68 0.76 0.08 0.75 0.62 −0.13
EQ 1 300 0.4 750 0.78 0.85 0.07 0.90 0.77 −0.13
CF 0.7 300 0.6 500 0.34 0.22 −0.12 0.23 0.10 −0.13
NC 0.9 100 0.2 250 0.87 0.79 −0.09 0.98 0.85 −0.13
EQ 1 100 0.4 250 0.79 0.77 −0.02 0.95 0.83 −0.13
CF 0.5 100 0.4 250 0.47 0.34 −0.13 0.23 0.13 −0.10
EQ 0.5 100 0.2 250 0.83 0.77 −0.06 0.78 0.68 −0.10
(Continued)
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TableA1 | Continued
Trial type Low-risk High-risk Older adults Younger adults
Prob. Amt. Prob. Amt. UG IG Change in RA* UG IG Change in RA*
CF 1 400 0.6 750 0.79 0.83 0.04 0.78 0.68 −0.10
EQ 1 400 0.4 1000 0.66 0.79 0.13 0.73 0.63 −0.10
EQ 0.5 400 0.2 1000 0.70 0.64 −0.06 0.65 0.58 −0.08
EQ 1 200 0.2 1000 0.66 0.61 −0.05 0.75 0.68 −0.08
NC 1 300 0.4 500 0.91 0.89 −0.03 0.98 0.90 −0.08
EQ 0.5 200 0.4 250 0.74 0.73 −0.01 0.75 0.68 −0.08
NC 0.9 300 0.2 1000 0.85 0.81 −0.04 0.85 0.79 −0.06
NC 1 400 0.4 500 0.87 0.83 −0.04 1.00 0.95 −0.05
NC 1 200 0.2 250 0.89 0.89 0.00 1.00 0.95 −0.05
NC 1 200 0.6 250 0.89 0.89 0.00 1.00 0.95 −0.05
NC 0.6 500 0.5 100 0.87 0.91 0.04 1.00 0.95 −0.05
NC 1 100 0.1 500 0.83 0.91 0.09 0.98 0.93 −0.05
NC 0.6 750 0.5 400 0.82 0.76 −0.07 0.98 0.95 −0.03
NC 0.9 200 0.4 250 0.87 0.85 −0.02 0.98 0.95 −0.03
NC 0.7 300 0.2 500 0.89 0.89 0.00 0.98 0.95 −0.03
NC 0.7 100 0.2 250 0.74 0.76 0.02 0.98 0.95 −0.03
NC 1 100 0.1 250 0.87 0.91 0.04 1.00 0.98 −0.03
NC 1 300 0.2 750 0.81 0.87 0.06 1.00 0.98 −0.03
NC 1 400 0.6 500 0.87 0.96 0.09 0.98 0.95 −0.03
EQ 1 100 0.1 1000 0.70 0.81 0.11 0.75 0.73 −0.03
CF 0.5 200 0.4 1000 0.37 0.11 −0.26 0.05 0.03 −0.03
NC 1 200 0.2 750 0.79 0.76 −0.03 0.95 0.93 −0.02
NC 0.9 400 0.4 750 0.85 0.89 0.04 0.93 0.92 0.00
NC 0.9 200 0.2 750 0.85 0.83 −0.02 0.93 0.93 0.00
NC 0.9 400 0.2 500 0.83 0.85 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.00
NC 1 400 0.1 1000 0.85 0.87 0.02 0.95 0.95 0.00
NC 0.7 400 0.1 250 0.93 0.96 0.02 1.00 1.00 0.00
NC 1 400 0.4 750 0.85 0.89 0.04 0.93 0.93 0.00
NC 1 300 0.2 250 0.91 0.96 0.04 0.98 0.98 0.00
NC 1 300 0.1 750 0.78 0.89 0.12 1.00 1.00 0.00
NC 0.7 300 0.4 500 0.82 0.83 0.01 0.80 0.83 0.02
NC 0.9 300 0.4 500 0.89 0.77 −0.13 0.90 0.93 0.03
NC 0.9 400 0.6 500 0.89 0.81 −0.09 0.95 0.98 0.03
NC 0.5 400 0.1 250 0.87 0.79 −0.09 0.98 1.00 0.03
NC 0.7 200 0.1 1000 0.87 0.83 −0.04 0.83 0.85 0.03
NC 0.9 300 0.6 250 0.81 0.83 0.02 0.98 1.00 0.03
NC 0.7 300 0.6 250 0.79 0.81 0.02 0.95 0.98 0.03
NC 0.7 400 0.1 500 0.77 0.79 0.02 0.98 1.00 0.03
NC 0.9 200 0.6 250 0.77 0.83 0.06 0.95 0.98 0.03
NC 0.6 1000 0.5 100 0.85 0.96 0.11 0.98 1.00 0.03
NC 0.9 200 0.1 500 0.81 0.74 −0.07 0.95 1.00 0.05
NC 0.9 200 0.1 750 0.85 0.83 −0.02 0.95 1.00 0.05
NC 0.5 400 0.2 750 0.83 0.82 −0.01 0.88 0.93 0.05
NC 0.5 300 0.1 250 0.89 0.93 0.04 0.95 1.00 0.05
NC 1 100 0.1 750 0.87 0.96 0.09 0.85 0.95 0.10
NC 0.9 100 0.1 750 0.78 0.89 0.11 0.88 0.98 0.10
EQ 0.5 100 0.1 500 0.64 0.71 0.07 0.55 0.68 0.13
NC 0.5 200 0.1 750 0.79 0.89 0.11 0.75 0.95 0.20
NC 0.7 100 0.1 500 0.87 0.85 −0.02 0.78 1.00 0.23
*Change in RA refers to the change in the frequency of selecting the high probability option, which, during conﬂict trials, was the operational measureo fR Ai no u r
study.
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